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INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic downturn of 2008-2009 has led to the current trade situation known as the 
“Great Trade Collapse”, an extensive downfall in world trade. At a world trade reduction of over 
12 percent, the Great Trade Collapse is the highest rate of trade contraction since 1945(Escaith et 
al., 2010; Baldwin, 2009). The large-scale nature of the economic downturn has been examined 
by various economists, many of whom cite the role of global supply chains in facilitating the 
rapid spread of the global recession (Escaith et al., 2010; Baldwin, 2009). While the particular 
causes of the recession vary, many economists suggest that the epicenter of the global recession 
is the United States. The fall of Lehman Brothers that occurred as part of the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis subsequently triggered a worldwide response. 
In his speech before World Trade Organization (WTO) members in February 2010, WTO 
Director-General Pascal Lamy expressed the need for continuing trade negotiations under the 
long-lasting Doha Round and for recognizing the importance of trade as a buffer against the 
global recession, both in the short-term and long-term. He emphasized that many of the 200 
million jobs lost worldwide can be recovered if WTO members maintain their commitment to 
trade and avoid protectionist and retaliatory measures (Council on Foreign Relations). 
Trade protectionism during a recession is not an uncommon phenomenon, and many 
governments facing political pressure to “save” domestic jobs often practice it. Trade theory 
unambiguously shows, however, that trade provides a net benefit to the domestic economy and 
helps the consumer. Still, the rent-seeking efforts of industries facing foreign competition often, 
at the expense of the American consumer, concentrate these benefits on a small percentage of 
industries by hindering trade with foreign competition. While political leaders may understand 
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that protectionism is not beneficial for the country as a whole, there have been several political 
initiatives and public efforts that are indeed protectionist, such as the bills introduced in 
Congress aimed at overhauling the establishment of trade negotiations. Many members of 
Congress are demanding stricter labor and environmental regulations as well as limiting the role 
of the WTO when proceeding with future trade negotiations. For example, Senator Sherrod 
Brown (D-OH) in the Senate and Representative Mike Michaud (D-ME) in the House, have 
introduced the 2010 version of the Trade Reform, Accountability, Development, and 
Employment (TRADE) Act.1 The TRADE Act demands revisions of the pending trade 
agreements with Panama, Korea and Colombia, as well as with other established trade 
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and future trade 
agreements. 
The Obama Administration has made some effort to encourage trade negotiations and 
trade expansion despite the current political climate. These measures include establishing the 
Export Initiative and supporting the ratification of the pending trade agreements. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton and United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk have concurred that the 
pending free trade agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama could be ratified by the end of 
2010. Nevertheless, with the political pressure from Congress, any and all trade negotiations may 
be delayed for quite some time, including agreements formed under the Doha Round.  
The apparent misalignment in United States trade policy during a recession is a 
representation of the polarized actions between Congress, the Presidential Administration, and 
the American public in resolving the issues of an economy facing falling output and rising 
unemployment. With the Great Trade Collapse as a result of one the largest recessions since the 
                                                
1 The 2008 TRADE Act could not pass into law when the 110th Congress closed. According to GovTrack.org, “At 
the end of each session all proposed bills and resolutions that haven't passed are cleared from the books. Members 
often reintroduce bills that did not come up for debate under a new number in the next session.”  
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1970s and the WTO in danger of losing some clout with the languishing Doha Round, the next 
steps taken by Congress and President Obama have the potential of significantly changing trade 
policy, for the better or worse. 
In this paper, divided into three segments, I will explore the underlying political issues 
occurring during a recession to define the impact a recession has on US trade policy. By first 
examining previous trends in US trade policy during a recession, such as the infamous Hawley-
Smoot Tariff Act, I will provide key insight into factors that will be at play during the current 
recession. Then I will assess current trade policy pursued by Congress and by the Administration 
to determine whether the US has succumbed to protectionism, despite the strides towards freer 
trade. Using the historical progression of trade policy, one can more accurately characterize the 
recent efforts by politicians to develop an advantageous trade strategy while considering the 
US’s role in a multilateral trading system. Lastly, I will examine the relationship between US 
trade policy and the Doha Round, which will serve as an illustration of the US commitment to 
free trade while facing an agenda of reviving the US economy. 
 
 
I.     PERSPECTIVE ON US PROTECTIONIST MEASURES AND THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
 
The United States has long been recognized as the lead proponent in laissez-faire policy, 
though this has not always been the case. In 1791, Alexander Hamilton, the first US Secretary of 
State, proposed that Congress protect the manufacturing sector from British competition by 
imposing high tariffs. Hamilton argued: 
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To maintain, between the recent establishments of one country, and the long-
matured establishments of another country, a competition upon equal terms, both 
as to quality and price, is, in most cases, impracticable. The disparity . . . must 
necessarily be so considerable, as to forbid a successful rival ship, without the 
extraordinary aid and protection of government.  
 
Hamilton’s request for infant industry protection was granted. Deemed the "Hamilton 
tariffs", the US manufacturing industry developed behind tariff barriers that reached up to 40 
percent but never below 25 percent (Elliot, 2005).  The tariffs allowed the government to earn 
revenue, yet Hamilton’s appeal for infant industry protectionism proved insignificant in 
expanding the US manufacturing sector’s growth. Moreover, though the Hamilton's request was 
for new industries, tariffs for the expansion of industrialization in the North continued well into 
the 19th century. 
Such tariffs were controversial since they provided benefits to the industrial North at the 
expense of the agrarian South. The Tariff of 1828, also known as the Tariff of Abominations, for 
example, served as a bone of contention between the North and the South, and was one of the 
many factors leading to the Civil War. Leaders from the South argued that tariffs increased the 
prices of British goods and caused the prices of their agricultural goods to increase, thereby 
reducing profits in the South.  
Bartlett states that the Republican Party introduced all major legislation encouraging 
tariffs during the late 18th and early 19th century. The Republican Party, created in 1854, was 
strongly aligned with the North and its industrial expansion. It was not until the Underwood tariff 
of 1913, signed by President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, that there was an attempt to reduce 
tariffs. Nevertheless, with Republicans assuming power after World War I, tariffs were raised 
again with the Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922 designed to protect manufacturing firms. 
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The Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922, though highly protectionist for raising tariffs by 
almost 40 percent, provided the first fundamental change to US trade legislation. Until the 
Fordney-McCumber Act, Congress had the exclusive power in formulating trade policy and 
trade negotiations. The Fordney-McCumber Act provided the President with the ability of either 
reducing or increasing tariffs by 50 percent when negotiating with countries for the purpose of 
helping domestic industries. However, the President could only establish these negotiations when 
recommended by the Tariff Commission, a congressional oversight committee.  
Bartlett shows that the tariffs of the 18th and early 19th century were not detrimental to 
the United States because exponential economic growth offset the negative influence of tariffs. 
According to his essay, the increase in immigration during this era and the rise of industries in 
which the United States had a comparative advantage, such as cotton and textiles, allowed the 
United States to grow despite tariffs. Congress continued to support tariffs in both times of 
prosperity and economic downturns during the 18th and early 19th centuries. The notion that 
tariffs could be used to complement growth defined America’s position on international trade 
until after the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
 
The Tariff that Caused a Trade War 
After World War I, the United States and other countries experienced a rare economic 
boom known as the “Golden Age”. Studies by Bairoch show that from 1913 to 1920, economic 
growth for developed countries was, on average, -1.3 percent, in part because of the war. 
Between 1920 and 1929, the average growth rate was 3.1 percent.  
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In 1928, Herbert Hoover ran his campaign as the Republican candidate. Despite the US 
experiencing economic prosperity, his stance on domestic industry and trade was highly 
protectionist. He stated in one of his campaign speeches: 
We realize that there are certain industries which cannot now successfully 
compete with foreign producers because of lower foreign wages and a lower cost 
of living abroad, and we pledge the next Republican Congress to an examination 
and where necessary a revision of these schedules to the end that American labor 
in these industries may again command the home market, may maintain its 
standard of living, and may count upon steady employment in its accustomed 
field (Republican Platform of 1928). 
 
Hoover’s speech reflects an isolationist approach to trade and the American public’s 
desire to obtain dominance in all aspects of their domestic market. In keeping his promise, in 
June 14, 1929, Hoover signed yet another bill that raised tariffs to protect domestic businesses. 
The prosperity of the 1920s ended soon thereafter. Only a few months later, the stock 
market crashed.  
The Great Depression began on October 29, 1929 with the stock market crash, known as 
Black Tuesday, and the subsequent bank runs. With a broken financial market, and without 
institutions to ease the crisis, the recession quickly became a depression. The unemployment rate 
reached 24 percent, a major sign that domestic industries were failing (O’Brien, 2001).   
Politicians were faced with the pressure of sustaining American industries and 
employment. Increasing tariffs seemed a direct solution. As in the past, politicians resorted to 
tariffs in an attempt to save the domestic market. Without considering the repercussions, the 
House of Representatives overwhelmingly supported the Hawley-Smoot Act introduced by 
Representative Willis Hawley (R-Oregon) and Senator Reed Smoot (R-Utah), which allowed 
tariffs to reach an all time high. The Senate, on the other hand, supported the bill only by a small 
margin (O’Brien, 2001). Hoover signed the Hawley-Smoot Act, though one thousand leading 
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economists petitioned Hoover to veto the Act, stating that increasing tariffs would limit growth 
and worsen the recession. The misconception that surrounded tariffs, however, allowed for the 
warning to be ignored (O’Brien, 2001).  
The Hawley-Smoot Act allowed Congress to establish “made-to-order” tariffs for 
whichever industry desired to protect their business (Bhagwati, 1988). For manufacturing goods, 
tariffs rose to an average near 50 percent, with some reaching rates of 100 percent (Bartlett, 
2009).   
The misconception that tariffs would encourage growth in the recession proved very 
detrimental. Many argue that the Hawley-Smoot Act was an important factor in turning the 
recession into the Great Depression by encouraging a global trade war.  
Richard Bedford Bennett, a Conservative candidate in Canada, called for retaliatory 
measures to offset the United States’ tariff increase. In his speech, he proclaimed: 
 
How many thousands of American workmen are living on Canadian money today? 
They've got the jobs and we've got the soup kitchens? I will not beg of any country to buy 
our goods. I will make [tariffs] fight for you. I will use them to blast a way into markets 
that have been closed (O’Brien, 2001). 
 
Many countries retaliated by increasing tariffs on US goods. Great Britain and Canada 
were particularly assertive, raising countervailing duties to the same extent of American tariffs.  
The intention of the Hawley-Smoot Act was to strengthen domestic industries and protect 
the agricultural sector from competition. Instead, as trade theory suggests, the increasing cost of 
domestic goods and products had a negative effect on consumers and producers.  With domestic 
consumption down, unemployment continued to increase as many domestic industries went out 
of business. The Hawley-Smoot Act undoubtedly contributed to the worsening of the depression, 
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and high tariffs, finally, were seen as a damaging and unproductive means of expanding 
domestic economic growth. 
 
The Move towards Trade Expansion 
The election of 1932 brought to light the weakness of the Hoover administration in 
overcoming the recession. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic candidate, emphasized as part 
of his political campaign that the high tariffs imposed by the Hoover Administration, among 
other things, worsened the depression and resulted in the high unemployment rate of the time. 
Many Americans bitter with the Hoover Administration agreed and therefore elected Roosevelt 
hoping for some relief from the Great Depression. 
As part of his agenda, Roosevelt established foreign policy that was unlike the isolationist 
decree of his predecessor.  Early in his term, Roosevelt signed the 1934 Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement Act, which reduced tariffs and encouraged trade negotiations with other countries. 
The Roosevelt administration successfully convinced Congress that trade policy transformed into 
a political game with significant consequences for the American consumer. As such, in this 
monumental legislation, the authority to determine tariffs and the rate of protection shifted from 
Congress to the President. This institutional shift “imparted a powerful anti-protectionist thrust to 
US policymaking” (Bhagwati, 1988).  
The Reciprocal Trade Act proved beneficial in expanding world trade by providing a 
basis for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT, formed as part of the 
international negotiations at Bretton Woods, is based on the two pillars of nondiscrimination and 
reciprocity (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). As a multilateral effort to solidify a global economy, the 
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GATT was instrumental in encouraging a worldwide reduction in tariffs, particularly in 
manufacturing.  
The GATT formed the interim committee for the International Trade Organization. But 
due to disagreement on establishing a international system for dispute resolution on issues of 
trade, the interim committee lasted over fifty years until the establishment of the WTO, chartered 
in 1995. Since the GATT was formed and the WTO established, over 100 countries have become 
members of the multilateral trading system. With more countries as members, the GATT and its 
successor the WTO have the potential of effectively reducing worldwide tariffs through the Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) clause and a sequence of trade rounds.  
One of the most important elements of the multilateral trading system was the removal of 
the inconsistency of tariff increases that resulted from political pressures faced during economic 
downturns. As stated: 
The principle of reciprocity has the effect of neutralizing the world-price effects 
of a government's decision to raise tariffs, and so it can eliminate the externality 
that causes governments to make inefficient trade-policy choices (Bagwell and 
Staiger, 1999, 218). 
 
Following the establishment of the GATT, the world then experienced a golden era of 
trade liberalization from the 1950s through the early 1970s; world income increased by 4.3 
percent and world trade by 6.1 percent. (Bhagwati, 1988). Within the US, the Reciprocal Trade 
Act of 1934 and the GATT transformed US trade legislation into attempts at trade promotion 
rather than protectionism. Membership in a multilateral system provided more incentive for the 
trade policy structure to include mediation and international oversight rather than inefficient 
unilateral measures.  
However, early on, the GATT did not have the transnational authority to hold countries 
accountable for protectionist measures, since many signatory countries viewed it as nothing more 
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than an agreement as opposed to a binding system with consequences for those countries that fail 
to oblige. In the US, many members of Congress deemed the GATT ineffective in resolving 
trade disputes due to its lengthy process. Negative criticism rose especially during the recession 
of the 1970s. Again, with firms facing tough foreign competition, Congress attempted to 
strengthen the domestic industry through trade measures. Therefore, Congress passed Section 
301 as part of the Trade Act of 1974, one of the most aggressive clauses to US trade legislation 
after creation of the GATT.  
 
Section 301: A Step Back 
The 1970s US recession was characterized by “stagflation”, which is a high rate of 
unemployment combined with inflation, which was a consequence of monetary policy and the 
increase in oil prices. Labonte and Mankinen note that though the US has relatively little reliance 
on international trade and, due to its economic strength, can be immune to the macroeconomic 
instability of other smaller countries, the increase in oil prices served as a surprising shock to the 
aggregate supply of the US economy. Still, Lebonte and Manikin (2002) find that inflation had 
risen unsteadily before the drastic increase in oil prices, and combined with “a secular decline in 
US-productivity that lasted 20 years”, the US fell into a deep recession. They also attribute the 
government’s policy of price and wage control in exacerbating the recession (Lebonte and 
Manikin, 2002).  
 The recession of the 1970s was the first global recession since the Great Depression. 
With regard to international trade, one difference between the Great Depression and the 
“stagflation” of the 1970s was the multilateral trading system. The United States had been part of 
six multilateral trade rounds at this point, and seemed fully engaged in trade negotiations. 
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Moreover, the US established the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) as 
part of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The multilateral trading system seemed promising, but 
the recession of the 1970s stood as the first test of its efficacy.  
During the 1970s, with productivity already declining in the manufacturing sector, 
competition with Japan proved exceptionally daunting. While many countries saw output 
decrease and unemployment rise at rapid rates, Japan was one of the few countries that saw 
growth, at an annual rate of about 5 percent a year (Jorgenson and Motohashi, 2003).  
The political pressure faced by politicians to save the declining manufacturing sector 
from competition with Japan resulted in one of the most assertive trade bills since Hawley-
Smoot. The 1974 Trade Act established Section 301 specifically aimed at protecting domestic 
industries from what it deemed as “unfair” foreign trade practices, allowing more authority (and 
pressure) for the President and the USTR to target other countries. In 1988 this measure was 
expanded to include an amendment requiring that the USTR create a regular list of countries 
practicing “unfair” trade measures (Behghin and Kherallah, 1998). Though the Reciprocal Trade 
Act of 1934 included Section 300, which allowed investigations into unfair trade practices, 
Section 301 allowed for tougher consequences including imposing trade sanctions. With the 
inception of the WTO, the US had legitimate oversight to address trade disputes, and trade 
sanctions are strongly disapproved under the WTO system.  
The following recessions in the early 1980s and early 2000s were relatively mild 
compared to the Great Depression and the “stagflation” of the 1970s, especially with regard to 
international trade. Countries were able to recover more rapidly, allowing trade volume to 
increase shortly thereafter. Therefore, during the recessions of the early 1980s and early 2000s, 
there were no major pieces of trade legislation established as protectionist, other than the 
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expansion of Section 301. However, this does not mean that the US did not raise tariffs or 
establish other protectionist measures.  Trade remedies such as countervailing duties and 
antidumping measures increased in the late 1970s and the 1980s (Bhagwati, 1988). In the early 
2000s, one of the most noteworthy protectionist measures was the implementation of tariffs on 
foreign steel, authorized by President George W. Bush. President Bush raised tariffs up to 30 
percent to protect the steel industry that was integral to economies in the Midwest, such as Ohio 
and Pennsylvania (Reuters, 2002). However, Bush removed these tariffs after the WTO ruled 
them illegal (Hoffman, 2009). 
 
Lessons from the Past 
 The history of US trade legislation provides insight to what to expect in the forthcoming 
years as the global economy continues recuperating. As economists often warn, recessions are 
used as an argument to encourage protectionism. However, from the onset of the Hamilton 
Tariffs to the Great Depression, we see tariffs increase despite the state of the economy, often 
being used to establish US dominance in the global market. After the Great Depression until 
today, tariffs are used to protect the domestic industry from “unfair” competition.  
Studies looking into the leading factors that encourage protectionism are plenty, with 
many reaching the consensus that the political environment is a significant element in 
determining the extent of protectionism and the onset of a trade war. Kherallah and Beghin 
assert: 
“The likelihood of a trade war increases when the United States’ export share in the 
world market declines, when the United States is less dependent on the market of the 
targeted country, when foreign policy makers are in an election year, and when 
negotiations relate to highly protected and unionized industries in the targeted countries” 
(1998, 1). 
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 In general, heavy competition with a foreign market may lead less competitive sectors, 
which are often unionized or highly organized, to seek the support of politicians to protect them. 
The politicians, then in turn maximize their utility by amassing more votes from the members of 
the organizations.  
As this historical perspective on trade legislation demonstrates, industries that need 
saving from foreign competition are often those that do not reflect the United States’ 
comparative advantage.  Tariffs in the United States, at first, served as infant-industry protection 
since the US lacked the endowments to procure a successful industrial society. The same story 
has carried into the modern era, and still determines which sectors receive the most government 
protection.   
Currently, the agricultural and manufacturing industries receive the most protection from 
the US government. However, when the US had a comparative advantage in each industry, 
protectionism was less for each industry. This is evident in the 18th century when the agricultural 
sector received little tariff protection in its favor at the expense of the manufacturing industry. 
Despite being at a disadvantage, the agricultural sector did not require tariff protection to 
succeed. However, around the 1920s, the agricultural sector became less competitive when 
developing countries began opening their economy through their own agricultural sector, and 
therefore encouraged Congress to protect them. Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 
as part of the New Deal, the government established agricultural subsidies that removed some 
competition, increased the prices of agricultural goods, and protected the farming industry from 
fluctuations in prices.  
Manufacturing industry has had a similar evolution in terms of protectionism. With tariffs 
directly benefiting industrialization that eventually served the US well, the removal of tariffs 
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became a difficult task for Congress. It was not until the 1950s when manufacturing firms were 
supportive of reducing tariffs, and was the leading sector in overwhelmingly supporting the trade 
expansion acts introduced in the 1960s (Griswald, 2010). Supporting trade expansion reflected 
the reality that manufacturing firms were, at the time, competitive in foreign markets and 
therefore benefited from trade. With the demise of productivity in the manufacturing industry 
reaching its peak in the 1970s, Congress enacted legislation that would uncompromisingly seek 
the “wrongdoings” of foreign firms providing a basis for applying trade remedy measures.  
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem maintains “factors of production in which a country is 
relatively scarce lose from trade… while abundant factors gain from trade” (Judkins and Milner, 
2004). The development of the agricultural sector and the manufacturing industry in trade 
demonstrates this and what Bhagwati (1988) calls the Darwinian Doctrine, in which firms 
engage in trade when they are competitive and expect to be winners in the global market. 
Without trade barriers, loser firms cannot be expected to compete successfully in the global 
market.  As Bhagwati so eloquently states, by competing with labor-intensive countries the 
“Stolper-Samuelson theorem becomes a dagger aimed at our unskilled workers’ jugular” (2002). 
When such industries cannot be competitive in the foreign and domestic market because of the 
US’s comparative advantage, seeking protectionist measures through the political process is the 
next step. The political party that is in the majority is often cited as an influential factor in 
determining which industries receive protection and to what degree. 
Republicans in the 18th century were supportive of tariffs for manufacturing industry, 
which seems in contrast to Republicans today who are often seen as the supporters of freer trade. 
Today, Republicans are more likely to stand down from a trade war, and less likely to initiate 
protectionist measures. A study finds that overall Republicans in Congress appear to back down 
Herrera 16 
from following through on a trade sanction more often than Democrats after initiating Section 
301, though both parties start the process of utilizing Section 301 at a rate of about five times a 
year (Beghin and Kherallah, 1998).  
The Republican Party’s shift from protectionism to freer trade and the Democratic Party’s 
change to support protectionism, though not clear, has been linked to “the position of American 
labor in an increasingly open economy” (Judkins and Milner, 2004). Their study shows that the 
right-wing party in developed economies is often aligned with interests of capital, whereas left-
wing parties are aligned with the interests of labor. Still, this alignment was not evident in the US 
until the 1970s when Democrats formed a strong alliance with unions, and supported 
protectionism for the declining manufacturing sector.  
Beghin and Kherallah show that Democrats maintain a tougher stance when using 
Section 301 and are more likely to pursue trade sanctions when finding a country is practicing 
“unfair” trade. Often, countries that become targets for the trade sanctions are those that are 
strong competition against the highly unionized sectors, such as manufacturing firms. The 
current Democratic party, once a party that supported free trade and through Roosevelt’s 
leadership can be recognized for encouraging a multilateral trading system, are now opposed to 
the very system that they helped establish. 
Hoffman (2009) studied American public opinion in matters of trade policy through a 
survey including 100 questions on trade and globalization, and some of the findings are 
surprising and almost counterintuitive to what we have learned so far. Though politicians aim to 
reflect the support of their constituents and party members, people’s opinion on trade policy and 
trade measures may not always reflect that of party affiliation. Hoffman finds that “party 
affiliation is not significantly related to [the publics’] opinions on ‘globalization’ or the 
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promotion of free trade.” Hoffman cites the most recent examples of President Clinton 
encouraging NAFTA and President Bush raising tariffs for steel in 2002. Hoffman finds that 
“despite the vilification by organized labor,” American Democrats in the survey were generally 
pro-NAFTA. Republicans were also supportive of President Bush when he raised tariffs. In fact, 
the survey revealed that Republicans were 31 percent more likely than Democrats to believe that 
tariffs were the correct measure to pursue. “In short,” Hoffman says, “attitudes on [issues of 
globalization and the promotion of free trade] may be influenced by political leaders, rather than 
long standing associations with party positions. Constituents may be more amenable to pointed 
appeals from party leaders.” 
Assuming that Hoffman’s studies are reflective of the general American population, one 
must question what truly influences politicians to vote on measures with a pro- or anti-trade 
stance. If politicians aim to improve the welfare of all Americans, why would Congress ratify 
any protectionist measure, such as Hawley-Smoot or agricultural subsidies, which would reduce 
national welfare? Many studies point towards the rent-seeking behavior of special-interest 
groups that influence politicians to vote for or against measures that may be beneficial to that 
sector or organization in determining why some protectionist measures are passed. 
Baldwin and Magee (1998) examined the degree in which special-interest groups 
influence politicians by studying the correlation between voting patterns and monetary 
contributions in regards to ratifying NAFTA and a 1994 agreement under the GATT.  Both 
treaties provoked divides between business and labor; business organizations were for NAFTA 
and the GATT agreement unlike the labor organizations. Baldwin and Magee suggest that 
without monetary contributions from either sector, NAFTA and the GATT agreement would 
have passed. Still, studying the affects of contributions from business and labor organizations, 
Herrera 18 
the study revealed that 62 representatives that voted against NAFTA were influenced by labor 
organizations, and contributions from business organizations influenced 34 representatives to 
vote for NAFTA. The most significant finding of this study is that it provides support to the 
theory that votes by politicians are, indeed, “for sale” (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009).  
The history of trade legislation and studies on trade policy and the political economy 
illustrate that there is no direct way to predict the steps the US government may take during the 
current recession. However, we are provided with some key insight on the probable measures 
that will be undertaken, and the logic as to why certain measures have and will be taken. With a 
Democratic majority in Congress and a Democratic President, the upcoming Congressional mid-
term elections in November 2010, which will take place during an economic slump, the next 
steps in trade policy are predicted to be protectionist. This is why the President’s commitment to 
the multilateral trading system while leading the US in recovering from the recession will be 
crucial in determining the extent of protectionism for the next few years.  
 
II. THE US RECESSION AND THE GREAT TRADE COLLAPSE OF 2008-2009 
 
Currently, the US is trying to recover from a recession that parallels the greater 
recessions of the past. Similar to the Great Depression, the United States is at the center of a 
worldwide economic downturn, facing major unemployment as industries, especially in 
manufacturing, wane in the face of foreign competition. 
There were various factors leading to the 2008 US recession that, at this moment, the US 
is still recovering from. It is known, however, that the two leading causes were an increase in 
sub-prime mortgages that led to widespread default and the house market bubble.  
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Figure 1 S&P Index showing time series of house prices 
Figure 2 New Home Construction from 2002-2008 
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The 2008 recession is said to have began many years prior, when various Administrations 
encouraged widespread home ownership. The Bush Administration followed the same policy, 
and combined with the low interest rates after the 9/11 terrorist attacks to encourage spending, 
American consumption was at an all-time high, including in the housing market.  
 Americans began purchasing homes at an increasing rate. While house prices 
skyrocketed, construction on new homes increased at a rate almost too fast to meet demand. 
Realtors and home-sellers were optimistic of the rapidly expanding house market, instead of 
being wary of an imminent housing bubble.  
Increased lending to subprime borrowers, who began to default on their home loans after 
the house price bubble, worsened the economy. Many of these borrowers were enticed by 
“teaser” variable interest rates that were low for the first year or two and would then drastically 
increase. “Teaser” low interest rates, encouragement to increase home ownership, and ”pressure” 
for making a substantial commission influenced lenders to categorize each mortgage package 
with an inappropriate rating. Say, for example, for a mortgage-backed security (MBS), the 
underlying loans had a rating of BB, which is much more risky than loans rated AAA. However, 
credit lenders would rate the package as AAA. 2 Investors were willing to pay more for a MBS 
that is a lower risk. Inaccurately rating a MBS meant more profit, while the holders of mortgage-
backed securities carried a larger risk.  
                                                
2 “[MBS] represents a pool of mortgages that have been securitized, which means they have been 
packaged by a securities firm into bonds that are sold to investors…as debtors pay off their 
underlying loans, the money is passed to the bondholders. However mortgage payments come in 
late or not at all. When mortgaged-backed bonds are packaged by private issuers, their credit 
quality varies, and some may expose you to more risk.” (Standard and Poor's guide to money and 
investing By Virginia B. Morris, Kenneth M. Morris). 
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Mortgage-backed securities are owned by many different entities in the financial market, 
such as investment firms and the US government. When private lenders categorized a risky 
mortgage as relatively safe, they were essentially overpricing the bond unbeknownst to the 
holder. When subprime borrowers began defaulting on their home loans at an increasing rate, the 
consequence was particularly heavy on investment banks.  
 As the value of MBSs started declining, it was more difficult for investment banks to 
raise capital. Firms lost interest in engaging with investment banks that were, at this point, 
considered to be at high-risk of defaulting on their obligations. By the time one the largest 
investment banks, Lehman Brothers, was denied a bailout from the government in 2008 and 
declared bankruptcy, the US had already entered a recession. The shaky financial market induced 
the recession, and had serious repercussions for countries around the world (see Timeline: U.S. 
Credit Crunch & Financial Failures for a more detailed description of the US Recession).  
 
How the US Recession Contributed to the “Great Trade Collapse” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Sources: WTO Online Database, reprinted by Baldwin 2009. 
Herrera 22 
 
Not since World War II have the rates of trade contraction been so high. Though in 
absolute terms, the trade collapse of 2008-2009 may not be the similar to the decrease in trade 
that occurred after the Great Depression, there is evidence that the rate of global trade 
contraction between 2008 and 2009 was the steepest and fastest on record (Baldwin, 2009). 
Baldwin notes that the growing consensus among economists on what caused the trade collapse 
was the decline in commodity prices and the international response to the fall of Lehman 
Brothers. Commodity prices fell months before the global recession, negatively affecting 
countries such as Australia that base their exports on commodity goods. In addition, the fall of 
Lehman Brothers served as a global indicator that the US financial market was unstable. The fear 
of which was further fortified by the fall of many other US banks. Baldwin suggests that foreign 
companies and domestic firms lost faith in the G7’s financial markets because of the inconsistent 
decisions made by the US government in resolving the crisis.  
 One of the major characteristics differentiating the current trade contraction from 
previous declines in trade is the existence of global supply chains. Baldwin notes that the 
transmission of information has exponentially increased due to the Internet. When leading 
economic indicators, such as a decline in consumption or an impending financial crisis, suggest a 
declining economy, many risk-averse firms instantaneously stop production. As part of a global 
supply chain, firms in different countries that work on various components of one product will 
also stop production.  
Baldwin does note that protectionism is not a major cause of the Great Trade Collapse: 
While many measures have been put in place – on average, one G20 government 
has broken its no-protection pledge every other day since November 2008 – they 
do not yet cover a substantial fraction of world trade. Protection, in short, has not 
been a major cause of the trade collapse so far (2009, 21). 
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Economists suggest that the Great Trade Collapse reached its worst point towards the end 
of 2009 and will begin to recover this year. Patrick Low, an economist for the WTO, says that 
trading will return to same level as 2007 by the end of 2010. Still, the Director-General of the 
WTO, Lamy, warns that the risk of protectionism will remain due to the “violence and shock of 
the downturn” (Freedman and Giles, 2010).  
Director-General Lamy is correct to a certain extent. In 2009, there was a 29.5 increase in 
import restrictions under trade remedy laws. At 76.9 percent, most of the countries initiating 
investigations to use trade remedies were developing countries (Bown, 2010). Still, between 
September 2009 and February 2010, these protectionist measures affected only 0.4 percent of 
world trade imports, which is down from 0.8 percent of the year 2008 (Miller, 2010). 
WTO economists are optimistic that the global economy will recover, and believe that the 
multilateral trading system has been effective in deterring countries from resorting to hasty 
protectionist measures. This is in stark contrast to the overall sentiment in the US Congress. 
 
III. PROTECTIONIST AND TRADE EXPANSIONARY MEASURES IN THE UNITED 
STATES  
 
In the US, protectionist measures are evident despite the forecasts of the recovering 
domestic economy. With the daunting struggle of keeping the domestic industries strong, many 
members of Congress are in favor of protectionist measures.  
 One measure deemed protectionist is inclusion of the “Buy American” provision in the 
fiscal stimulus bill American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Government procurement 
is a point of contention between WTO members, and is generally seen as unacceptable to the 
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multilateral trading system. President Obama was opposed to including the provision, stating to 
members of Congress that a “Buy American” provision is a "potential source of trade wars that 
we can't afford at a time when trade is sinking all across the globe" (Gesser, 2010). 
Another protectionist measure resulting from the recovery is the government bailout of 
various industries, such as General Motors. With the government subsidizing General Motors, 
the government is making it more difficult for foreign firms with a comparative advantage in the 
auto industry to compete. This is reminiscent of the early 1980s when the US government 
imposed a voluntary export restriction (VER) with Japan, limiting the imports of automobiles 
from Japan to allow domestic automobile manufacturers to remain competitive (Concise 
Encyclopedia of Economics, Bhagwati).  
Aside from subsidizing American car manufacturers, the recession has once again 
allowed Congress to target countries that prove to be too much competition for American 
manufacturing firms.  
 
Signs of a Trade War: A Case-Study of the US Trade Relationship with China  
Beghin and Kherallah and Beghin (1998) make a prediction in their paper that the US 
will target developing countries in Asia. The countries in Asia, they mention, were expected to 
grow by utilizing their comparative advantage in labor, and eventually become competition for 
America’s declining manufacturing industry. Beghin and Kherallah were correct, as now China 
serves as the main threat to growth in the manufacturing sector.  
 Manufacturing firms in the US have labeled China as a rogue member of the WTO, often 
pointing to China’s state-owned firms and the government’s innate role in the expansion of its 
economy. The US is not alone in blaming China’s growth to artificial and manipulated factors. In 
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2008, China was the target of 73 anti-dumping cases brought to the WTO, with entities such as 
the European Zone and India following the lead of the US in targeting China (Stevenson, 2009). 
Since 1995, China has remained the number one target of antidumping investigations, with a 
grand total of 677 anti-dumping investigations. In terms of countervailing duties, China is also 
the number one target for investigations (Stevenson, 2009). Some economists contend that China 
will remain a target of trade remedies, so long as China expands while other countries contract 
during the recession. 
Despite the global recession, China is one of the few countries experiencing growth, 
currently at a rate of 8.7 percent, which is down from 9.6 percent in 2008 (Economist, April 
2010). In terms of trade, exports account for 24.5 percent of its GDP. However, the figures can 
be misleading in measuring the actual economic expansion of China in relations to its exports. 
The Economist (April 2010) shows that exports have contributed to only one-tenth of China’s 
growth, and, in general exports have fallen since 2007 and are expected to continue falling as 
Chinese citizens increase their domestic consumption.  
A consensus among members of Congress is that China is having an export-led success 
because of its artificially depressed currency (see, e.g. Bradsher, 2010). They argue that China’s 
government is buying more foreign currency and selling their own to purposely depreciate the 
RMB at the expense of the US, and further accusing China of being the ultimate cause of the 
recession. Many politicians have taken a strong stance against China by demanding that the 
Chinese government allow the RMB to appreciate in order to lessen the US trade deficit.  
When President Obama was a presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, he took a 
definitive stance on US-China trade relations, and supported protectionist measures to correct for 
China’s wrongdoing. Since winning the election, however, President Obama has maintained a 
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more neutral stance, hoping that talks with China could be the means of reaching a compromise. 
In fact, the 600-page report published by the USTR in investigating unfair trade practices does 
not reference China manipulating their currency (Reuters, March 2010). The Administration’s 
position also illustrates the cumbersome reality that China owns much of the US national debt, 
and that the US would ultimately suffer from a trade war with China.3   
Still, compromise is not what many of the proponents of taking action against China 
recommend. Many feel that the President’s administration is not doing enough to hold China 
accountable, such as Alan Specter (D-PA) whose speech to the US Steelworkers said: 
For many years now, American steel workers have had to compete in a world that 
preaches free trade but very often practices illegal trade…China is guilty of 
international banditry. China violates our trade laws with impunity, robs 
American workers of their jobs, takes our money and lends it back and now owns 
a big part of America (Press Release, April 2010). 
 
As an attempt to hold China accountable for manipulating its currency, five senators 
introduced a bill in March 2010 titled the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 
2010. The bill is a response by politicians that have felt the Administration is too lenient in 
determining China as a currency manipulator (Grover, 2010). This aggressive measure demands 
that the US Treasury Secretary, Tim F. Geithner, take a more proactive role in determining 
whether a currency is being manipulated and allows for a stronger reprimand from the United 
States if a country fails to realign its currency. Also, following in the steps of the Senate, 130 
House members signed a letter urging the Treasury secretary and the Commerce Department to 
begin taking action against China to protect US manufacturers.  
                                                
3 The US Treasury sells US securities to foreign central banks in order to finance the US government spending and 
consumer debt. As of March 2010, China holds $1.2 trillion in US government debt (Dickson, 2010). 
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In support of action against China, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), a leading sponsor 
of the bill, has argued that the trade deficit caused by China cost 2.4 million American jobs 
between 2001 and 2008 (Grover, 2010).  
The figure of 2.4 million jobs lost because of China is taken from the Economic Policy 
Institute that uses the quantity of Chinese imports to measure the overall job loss. However, this 
study is notoriously known to overstate the amount of imports by failing to include only the real 
added value of Chinese production (Ikenson, 2010). For example, a study by Linden, Kraemer 
and Dedrick (2007) shows that only $4 of every $150 that an iPod costs is value-added from 
China. However, the study from the Economic Policy Institute includes the total import from 
China as $150 because, after being assembled in China, the US imports the iPod.  
As of this year, tariffs against China have been enacted to protect job loss in industries 
that are in competition with China. For example, an 18 percent tariff on tires from China was 
implemented at the urging of both Democrat and Republican representatives arguing on behalf of 
United Steelworkers union that the low price of tires had claimed US jobs. Other antidumping 
measures against China are being investigated in the sale of electric blankets, iron, steel, paper, 
oil pipe, and metal wire (McCue, 2010).  
Despite the worries of Congress, economist Joseph Stiglitz says a trade war with China 
will not benefit either country in the long run. Stiglitz notes that the United States may unfairly 
blame China for the US trade deficit only because it is the biggest source of competition. As 
Stiglitz states: 
Saudi Arabia also has a bilateral and multilateral surplus: Americans want its oil 
and Saudis want fewer US products. Even in absolute value, Saudi Arabia's 
multilateral merchandise surplus of $212 billion in 2008 dwarfs China's $175 
billion surplus. As a percentage of GDP, Saudi Arabia's current-account surplus, 
at 11.5% of GDP, is more than twice that of China (2010). 
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Moreover, some politicians do not consider that the large US trade deficit can be 
attributed to factors other than the exchange rate, such as the low national savings rate and the 
government deficit (Stiglitz, 2010). The United States is a consumer-oriented country that has 
been characterized by “over consumption” due to the wide availability of credit and massive 
consumer debt, which is in contrast to China’s high savings and relatively lower consumption 
rate. Furthermore, China’s endowment of labor allows firms that export to sustain low wages and 
keep their business open. The low-cost goods produced by these firms are especially beneficial 
in the recession as more Americans are demanding low-cost and low-quality goods.  
Nevertheless, there is evidence indicating that China’s currency is under-valued and that 
the government has an integral role in its export success. Using the Balassa-Samuelson model, 
Frankel (2006) shows that at China’s growth rate, China’s real exchange rate is not at the level it 
should to be. Frankel says that according to the model, the RMB is under-valued by 40 percent 
and states that the RMB should be appreciating. A less technical measure of currency 
devaluation, but often cited as a relatively accurate, is the Big Mac index. According to the 
Economist, the RMB is close to 50% under-valued against the US dollar.  
Moreover, the largest of the state-owned firms received the highest amounts of the 
Chinese government’s stimulus spending through its banks. China depends on these firms to 
maintain jobs in the export market, thus maintaining its current account surplus (Economist, 
2010).  
However, if China were to allow the RMB to appreciate, the effect would be small in 
terms of reducing the US trade deficit and may actually worsen the situation in the United States. 
The Economist (March 2010) notes that by allowing the RMB to appreciate, the effect will be 
limited to the real competitiveness of China’s industries. Moreover, the increased price of 
Herrera 29 
Chinese goods will have an effect on certain groups of producers and consumers in the US. 
Allowing the RMB to appreciate would increase the costs of Chinese exports, which the US, to a 
certain extent, relies on. Large retailers, such as Wal-Mart, use a significant quantity of Chinese 
goods. Many customers at these retailers are low-income to middle-income households. 
Therefore, tariffs on Chinese goods will serve as a regressive tax (Ikenson, 2010). 
One must also note that China, in comparison to other emerging economies, practices 
fewer acts of protectionism with an average applied tariff of 9.6 percent in 2008. India, for 
example, surpasses this amount with their average applied tariff of 13 percent.  Nevertheless, 
America has a more open economy than China, with an average applied tariff of only 3.8 percent 
(Economist, April 2010). 
Congress’ fear that China may be the nemesis of free trade is exaggerated. Yet, concerns 
about protectionism are not unfounded. Many indicators point to there being more that China can 
do to ensure freer trade, but the same can be said for the United States. Free-trade supporter 
Bergsten has advised the Administration to utilize the legal mechanism of the WTO, instead of 
the International Monetary Fund that overlooks foreign exchange policies, to persuade the 
Chinese government to allow its currency to appreciate, even at the expense of a political battle 
(Wall Street Journal, 2010). However, what Bergsten suggests and Congress’ method of 
targeting and blaming China for the US recession is unproductive, and will lead to an inevitable 
trade war. If China were to allow the RMB to appreciate, it will do so on its own terms and not 
under the spotlight placed on it by the US. Also when they do, the US will still find that there 
will be little change to the current account deficit and that the effects of the recession will not 
disappear.  
 
Herrera 30 
The Congressional Solution to “Unfair” Trade 
 As identified in this paper, along with various other studies, the role of Congress in 
determining trade policy becomes more critical and invasive in times of an economic downturn. 
Trade policy will likely be a controversial issue in the upcoming Congressional mid-term 
elections, and tensions with foreign countries, including China, will be at the forefront of 
debates.   
Currently, Congress seeks a more important role in determining trade legislation; a role 
that was diminished after Roosevelt passed the Reciprocal Trade Act. Trade legislation ever 
since has highlighted the Administration’s role in determining trade negotiations, trade 
expansion, and trade protection. Section 301, however, was a major step in allowing an 
Administration to act in a more biased manner towards domestic industries, and in turn towards 
political sway. During the current recession, trade bills that have been introduced in the Senate 
and House are far more assertive and insistent on including Congress in trade negotiations than 
ever before. Some bills demand outright that the Administration no longer have the dominant 
role, outlining steps for Congress to have the final say on trade policy.  
The Currency Act is only one bill of many introduced in Congress that places more 
pressure on the Administration and that aims to reclaim the role of Congress in determining trade 
policy. One other major bill, the first draft of which was introduced in 2008 and amended in 
2010, is the TRADE Act.  
The TRADE Act, introduced in both the Senate and the House, is a drastic measure that: 
Mandates reviews of all international trade agreements currently in force, establish new 
standards and requirements for future trade agreements, require new labor standards, and 
impose higher congressional oversight for any trade agreements (Global Trade Watch, 
2009).  
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 The TRADE Act aims to repair the “damage” previous trade negotiations may have 
imposed on less competitive industries, such as the agricultural and manufacturing sector. 
Moreover, there is a clause that provides continued subsidies for the agricultural sector, despite 
proposals to decrease agricultural subsidies in the Doha Round. Future trade negotiations under 
this Act will also keep the agricultural and manufacturing industry at the forefront of benefits by 
enforcing environmental and labor regulations. Failing to oblige may mean US withdrawal from 
the trade agreement or the US imposing trade sanctions. By demanding such regulations on 
emerging economies that are labor-intensive, American manufacturing firms can more easily opt 
for trade remedies whenever trade partners fail to abide.  
 The time process of establishing trade negotiations under the TRADE Act will be 
lengthened because of a clause removing Presidential Trade Promotion Authority, or what is 
often referred to as fast track. Fast track allows the President to establish trade negotiations 
without much input from Congress, and under a much shorter time span. Congress members are 
able to vote on the trade agreements proposed by the Administration, but cannot amend clauses 
in the trade negotiation. 
 One of the most potentially detrimental features of the TRADE Act is removing aspects 
that are conducive to the WTO and undoing the intent of the multilateral trading system of 
expanding trade. For example, there is a provision that authorizes the use of “Buy American” 
stipulations in future multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations, despite future negotiations 
made under the Doha Round and the WTO.  
This bill has over 140 bipartisan supporters in the House and Senate. Though bipartisan, 
Democrats are more in favor of the TRADE Act than Republicans.  
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The TRADE Act is the leading bill aimed at reforming trade policy to include 
Congressional oversight. On January 14, 2009, Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY) and Sander Levin 
(D-MI) introduced the Trade Enforcement Act along with 9 other sponsors. The Trade 
Enforcement Act is similar to the TRADE bill but less extreme (Global Trade Alert, 2010). Also, 
on March 2, 2010, Gene Taylor (D-MO) introduced H.R. 4759, which mandates the withdrawal 
of the United States from NAFTA.  
These bills combined reflect a skewed belief in Congress that the costs of free trade 
weigh heavily on domestic industry, though trade theory shows that freer trade leads to improved 
national welfare. Congress is attempting to undo the measures and intent of the Reciprocal Trade 
Act of 1934, transferring authority from the President to Congress through the TRADE Act. 
Furthermore, Congress is ensuring that the multilateral trading system takes a backseat to the 
concerns of the domestic industry.  
Congress’ increased input through these bills will permanently place “political sway” in 
the formulation of future trade policy measures. By passing the TRADE Act, the US will fall into 
an era similar to that of the Great Depression, in which high made-to-order tariffs further 
worsened the recession. Though there are those who claim that the bills will not be passed, one 
must heed the cautionary tale of trade in the 1970s. The Trade Act of 1974, created in the already 
established multilateral trading system under the auspices of the GATT, shows the impact a 
recession has on trade policy. Despite a multilateral trading system, the US established Section 
301 to allow independent and unilateral decisions on trade matters, and as a way for American 
business to remain dominant during a global recession.  
 
President Obama’s Trade Policy 
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Although Congress is a Democratic majority led by Democratic President Obama, trade 
policy is an issue in which Congress and the President have different approaches. President 
Obama’s trade policy is relayed through the USTR, Ron Kirk. On March 1, 2010 Kirk released 
the President’s 2010 Trade Policy Agenda titled Making Trade Work for America’s Working 
Families. Reading this Agenda, one finds the evident struggle between making free trade policy 
among a recession with high unemployment and the public’s fears that trade may cost jobs. The 
title alone alludes to the concern that the US has with foreign labor and how trade negotiations 
have yet to satisfy America’s bottom line. President Obama has publicly declared that his 
administration will remain strongly committed to the WTO and completing the Doha Round. 
Though, his commitment to Doha is second to strengthening the domestic economy. About 40 
percent of Americans say that trade agreements benefit the U.S. economy, according to Drajem 
(2010). President Obama’s policy, then, is a clear illustration of seeking a balance of free trade, 
while appeasing the American public and Congress who are currently favoring less foreign trade. 
Foreign labor is a significant concern in the President’s agenda for 2010, conveyed 
through the rhetoric of enforcing labor standards and human rights protection with trade partners.  
Over the last year, we also instituted more vigorous scrutiny of foreign labor practices 
and began to redress practices that impinge upon labor obligations in our trade 
agreements, deny foreign workers their internationally recognized rights, and tilt the 
playing field away from American workers (Trade Policy Agenda).  
 
The Trade Agenda is particularly keen on establishing oversight and regulation with 
countries that are in competition with US industries, including China.  
Moreover, the Trade Agenda demands more regulation of environmental practices, and 
has established a subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee whose sole responsibility is 
ensuring that Free Trade Agreement partners comply with the environmental standards.  
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One major pursuit in future multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations is the protection 
of intellectual property, the protection of which is considered insufficient under the WTO even 
with the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The Agenda notes that 
without protection of intellectual property, multilateral trading is undermining the United States’ 
comparative advantage in “innovation and creativity.” The US will seek negotiations that 
increase trade liberalization in this field, but as long as trade partners implement intellectual 
property rights.  
Though the US demands more regulation of labor practices, the environment and 
intellectual property, the US criticizes the food regulation standards and sanitary standards of 
other countries that “obstruct” trade. Therefore, it is evident that President Obama also seeks to 
reinforce America’s dominance in the global market.  
Still, despite using regulations as a non-tariff barrier to trade, President Obama will 
attempt to expand trade through various programs, such as removing special interest groups from 
the formulation of trade policy, establishing trade with the Asian-Pacific countries, and by 
establishing the Export Initiative. However, the Export Initiative been criticized by many 
economists as an impracticable measure that will not be fulfilled for at least another ten years. 
First, the shift would require that national savings increase substantially, which would be 
difficult for a high-consumption country to gravitate towards. Next, firms will have to sell 
products that are in high demand overseas, which is not the case. Robert Kuttner was quoted in 
the Economist (March 31, 2010) stating, “There are just too many products that we no longer 
make and too many foreign links in the industrial supply chain.” In the same article, it is 
mentioned that the increase in exports can only come from firms that use “sophisticated, 
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knowledge-intensive capital goods like microprocessors, and high-end services like 
engineering”. 
Trade in services, which is America’s current comparative advantage, contracted at a 
smaller rate than other goods in the Great Trade Collapse, and has had positive growth since the 
fall. The fact that President Obama has included the protection of the service industry from trade 
competition under the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) demonstrates that the US recognizes 
the integral shift in US comparative advantage.  
Despite Congress’ attempt in limiting the role of the multilateral trading system, 
President Obama has affirmed commitment to utilizing the “rule-based trade system anchored by 
the WTO” and further highlights how successful trade remedy measures were taken against 
China legally under the WTO. This is a positive sign that the Administration views the WTO 
effective in settling trade disputes.  
 
IV. THE DOHA ROUND AND US LEADERSHIP 
 The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations started in 2001, and has since been 
recognized as an unsuccessful attempt to improving the multilateral trading system. Though 
Director-General Lamy remains optimistic that the talks are “worth the effort”, the intense divide 
between developed and developing countries, says otherwise. 
 The Doha Round is taking place within a transformation in international trade. Developed 
countries are shifting from predominantly manufacturing-based economies to service economies 
that best utilize the high-skill labor and high-technology capital endowments of these countries. 
Emerging economies are evolving from agrarian-based economies to manufacturing, whereas 
developing countries are increasingly opening their economies through their agricultural sectors. 
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The implication of this transformation is significant in explaining why the Doha Round is 
deadlocked.  
 When the GATT was created in 1947, only 23 countries were signatories, most 
developed and emerging economies. According to Collier (2006), the GATT was signed by 
major developed and emerging economies that could benefit from the decrease in manufacturing 
tariffs. He further mentions that the US, EU and Japan were gaining economic momentum after 
the GATT as large trading partners. The benefits of the GATT were clear in allowing the 
reduction of tariff barriers for years thereafter. At present, with 153 countries at various stages of 
economic development aiming for full integration in the WTO, the disagreements are large 
enough to hinder more progressive steps towards freer world trade. The trade relationships 
between developed, emerging and developing economies are resulting in clashes over issues 
such as agriculture and regulations relating to labor and the environment. 
The US and the EU provide the most protection for their agricultural sector through 
government-funded subsidies. According to the CIA World Fact Book, the agricultural sector of 
the United States comprises only 1.2 percent of GDP and employs only 2 million people, and the 
European Union’s agricultural sector contributes to only 2 percent of GDP. Yet, over $48 billion 
is spent on direct government payments, and 40 percent to 50 percent of all EU spending goes 
towards subsidizing the farming industry under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
(Godfrey, 2002). These measures impose great limitations on developing countries that seek to 
open their economies. Often, the surplus commodities from EU firms and US firms are sold at a 
much lower rate on the world market, which can damage a developing countries’ domestic 
economy for at least a couple of years. Developing countries therefore contend that tariffs be 
applied to their domestic industries, in order that they to adjust to the effects of trade for at least 
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the first few years as members of the WTO. Some countries argue that these tariffs be as high as 
100 percent.  
 The Obama Administration has agreed to reduce trade barriers in the agricultural sector 
from $48 billion to $15 billion so that there is some compromise. Though the number may seem 
slight in absolute terms, the attempt is significant. Reducing subsidies in the agricultural sector 
has been attempted in the past by different presidents, but have been unsuccessful. The removal 
of subsidies is difficult because of the politics surrounding the protection of the agricultural 
sector. Agricultural lobbyists are often aggressive in insuring that the sector continues receiving 
subsidies, despite the negative affect on developing countries and increasing prices of 
agricultural commodities in the US.  
 For there to be any progress in removing subsidies from the agricultural sector, developed 
countries, not the US alone, must make a commitment to at least reduce agricultural subsidies so 
that developing countries are not so adversely affected. This will reduce the incentives for 
developing countries to impose tariffs on agricultural commodities. 
 Though the US may not give into wishes of developing countries, it raises strict demands 
that may be impossible for developing countries to follow. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the 
US Congress is pressing to include strict regulations on labor and environmental standards. Some 
economists, including Collier, suggest that such measures are protectionist and impose an 
artificial trade advantage on the behalf of the US. Developing countries and emerging economies 
are not at a stage where they can afford environmental and labor regulations, and attempting to 
impose these regulations would be costly as well as time consuming. Studies have identified that 
the best means of obtaining higher standards in labor and environmental protection is through 
economic development. Many current developed economies experienced increases in pollution 
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and weak labor protection when industrializing their economies, and developing countries in the 
modern era are no exception. Tariffs and imposing trade sanctions on these developing 
economies that have lower standards will not be fruitful. A better approach is through technology 
transfers; developed economies can help developing countries ascertain higher environmental 
and labor standards when developing countries have the right tools. However, it is difficult to 
change the intrinsic structure of a developing country’s economy; a labor-intensive country will 
most have often have less human rights protection.  
Environmental and labor regulations within Free Trade Agreements and through the 
Doha Round are seen as a direct measure to marginalize developing countries and impede their 
economic growth. Unfortunately, President Obama remains aligned with Congress on this matter 
stating that he hopes to see these regulations on future trade negotiations, without urging a more 
effective mechanism in assisting developing countries and trade partners to achieve these 
unfeasible regulations.  
Regrettably, the future of trade negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, rests on 
whether or not the US finds an upper-hand advantage without compromise. Congress’ attempts 
in formulating legislation that will impose stricter regulations, diminish the importance of the 
WTO in settling trade disputes, and that are without compromise on removing trade barriers, 
such as the “Buy American” provision and protection of agricultural subsidies, demonstrates a 
political fear for the future of America’s position in the world. A free trade mantra is now 
perceived as inflicting a wound on the strength of America’s economy, as countries, such as 
China, continue rising in strength. The erratic attempts by politicians in Congress to induce 
protectionist provisions in future trade negotiations is an unfortunate consequence, and will 
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therefore forever change the face of the multilateral trading system. That is, unless the following 
recommendations are approached.  
 
Recommendations 
 It is without saying that allowing Congress to gain complete oversight of US trade policy 
will be detrimental to trade itself. The Reciprocal Trade Act, the GATT and the WTO are all 
measures that sought the removal of politics from the multilateral trading system, which would 
allow for the best means of reaching a world of free trade. The history of US trade legislation 
demonstrates that President Obama has the ability of ensuring free trade, through his actions and 
through his rhetoric. 
 If the TRADE Act and other bills similar to it pass in Congress, President Obama must 
resort to his veto power to stop the bill from becoming legislation. Even with slight revisions, 
these bills have several measures that are protectionist and should not be allowed under the WTO 
rules.  
 By supporting environmental and labor regulations, however, President Obama is also 
supporting protectionism. Though he calls for a better global environment through the use of 
clean and alternative energy, limiting carbon emissions, etc., his efforts are best concentrated in 
the US and other developed countries.  
 US leadership within the Doha Round is essential to encouraging further trade 
negotiations between developed and developing countries. Though reducing agricultural 
subsidies will be difficult, President Obama must keep his promise to the developing countries. 
Subsidies on cotton were deemed illegal after Brazil presented its case against the US in the 
WTO. Subsidies on other agricultural goods, such as rice, should be no different in being deemed 
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illegal. It is only a matter of time when other countries, with enough resources, present a case 
against the agricultural subsidies in the US.  
   
  
Conclusion 
 The GATT and the WTO were formed as result of the grave repercussions of the global 
trade war in the 1930s. After the Great Depression, it was finally apparent that when a country 
aims solely towards strengthening its domestic economy, in the end they will shut themselves out 
from the benefits of a global economy. With a country as large and economically powerful as the 
United States, the impact of the political decisions can infiltrate many countries around the 
world. This story rings true today, as we find that all countries are shaken by the financial crisis 
in the US.  
Many will have to cope with the uncertainty that abounds while recovering from a 
recession. The US is in position of adjustment, and with change there is looming fear. Farmers, 
teachers, doctors, investment bankers, and other citizens will be learning that the “over 
consumption” that has defined America for many years can no longer be sustained. The 
Administration and Congress, in demanding that China allow their currency to appreciate and 
establishing the Export Initiative, is positioning the US for a fundamental shift from a debtor 
country to a creditor country. Though the transition is a far reach and can only be obtained after 
some time, such a shift will influential for the US’s trade position and future trade negotiations.   
Abroad, we find that other countries are in the same dilemma, but with an additional 
worry. Developed and developing countries alike are now questioning if a strong reliance on the 
United States will mean another recession that is out of their control. They too want to strengthen 
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their domestic economies, and for some that may mean reducing the impact of a global recession 
by diversifying their relationships with other trade partners.  
The reality, however, is that the US for some time will continue as the world’s largest 
economy. For this reason, America’s position on trade and the multilateral trading system is 
significant. While countries are keeping a keen eye on America’s recovery, now is the opportune 
time for the US to display a commitment to trade.  
Though members of Congress are attempting to undo the strength of the multilateral 
trading system, it is still the case that the President has the ability to persuade his constituents 
that trade works in favor of the American citizen. The President can urge members of Congress 
to reach a compromise with trading partners, rather than applying stricter barriers to trade. But, 
most importantly, he must be seen as the leading advocate for freer trade and for progress in the 
current Doha Round.  
To some extent, President Obama’s policies on trade are not as protectionist as studies 
would predict. Yet, we find that there is little solid effort in expanding trade. President Obama’s 
approach to trade demonstrates a reluctance that free trade will be considered favorable by the 
American public, and especially the unions that have strongly aligned in favor of his election. He 
will risk the chance of the union vote, which may also affect his chances of re-election. But, 
President Obama ought to heed the lessons of the past when he takes the next few steps in trade 
policy, and remain cautious of the recourse taken by members of Congress.  
Though centuries have passed since Adam Smith outlined the then radical idea that free 
trade benefits all countries that engage in it, we find the ominous warning that many studies, 
some of which are presented in this paper, also conclude. Smith warns: 
To judge whether [tariff] retaliations are likely to produce such an effect, does not, 
perhaps, belong so much to the science of a legislator, whose deliberations ought to be 
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governed by general principles which are always the same, as to the skill of that insidious 
and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose councils are directed 
by the momentary fluctuations of affairs (204-205). 
 
 The true nemesis of free trade is not China or the developing countries, or any other 
country reaching an “unfair” trade advantage. The greatest threat is a politician, who acts on 
behalf of a constituent, but can overall be persuaded by a rent-seeking lobbyist that is able to pay 
for his or her campaign.  
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